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12. Globalization and multi-level




The starting point for most of the chapters in this book is that lawmaking, and
more particularly the development of private law, poses specific challenges in
the era of globalization. It is this particular influence of the broad globaliza-
tion phenomenon on private lawmaking that has been the central focus of the
contributions in this book. This chapter will take up the challenge to examine
this relationship between globalization and (private) lawmaking as far as the
area of environmental law is concerned.1
There are potentially so many interfaces between globalization and envi-
ronmental problems that one could easily write an entire monograph simply
dealing with this relationship. The aim of this chapter is, however, more
modest. I will merely attempt to identify the influence of environmental issues
on globalization and vice versa, from both a positive and a normative perspec-
tive. This will allow me to identify a few issues that play a role in this respect
and to indicate a few areas where the relationship between globalization and
environmental law could lead to tensions.2 Within the scope of this chapter it
is not possible to even attempt to resolve these tensions. One can at most try
to identify some core questions and analyse to what extent environmental
issues pose problems or challenges for globalization that may be different
from those in other areas discussed in this volume.
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1 See on this topic also the challenging paper by Wirth (2007).
2 However, according to some authors these tensions are highly exaggerated.
See for example Wirth (2007, p. 1): ‘Pitting globalization and environment against each
other as conflicting goals is a simplistic and self-defeating perspective.’ Also Howse
holds that it is at this moment no longer useful to discuss whether globalization as such
is good or bad: ‘This debate, I argue, is over, above all because the antiglobalizers have
themselves gone global’ (Howse 2008, p. 1529). See, however, for a different perspec-
tive the contributions in Speth (2003).
The central issue discussed in this chapter is hence how an analysis and
discussion of environmental pollution and the related environmental law and
policy issues can contribute to a quest for the relationship between globaliza-
tion and private law, which lies at the heart of the contributions to this volume.
1.2 Challenges
There is a broad literature on the relationship between globalization and
specific environmental problems. In this respect, one can for example refer to
the broad literature on sustainable development3 or one could focus on the
question of how international law could be used as a remedy against trans-
boundary environmental pollution4 or on the literature on multi-level gover-
nance and the environment.5 These and many other issues are debated under
the heading of globalization and environmental problems. Some economists
pay particular attention to the relationship between economic competitiveness
and environmental issues6 or to the relationship between free trade and envi-
ronmental protection.7
It is of course impossible within the scope of this chapter to discuss all of
these issues in detail. Hence, a different approach will be followed. I will
rather try to identify the various types of potential conflicts between environ-
mental protection and globalization by structuring the various potential topics
along two main lines of division (although I immediately admit that in some
cases it is not so easy to sharply distinguish where a particular issue or conflict
should best be categorized). A first dividing issue is whether the problem
concerns the influence of environmental problems on globalization or whether
it is rather the reverse – that globalization has a particular influence on envi-
ronmental law and policy. A second dividing line would be to identify the posi-
tive analysis whereby one would examine or rather describe the mutual
relationship between environmental pollution and globalization. This would
be distinguished from the situation where a normative statement would be
384 Globalization and private law
3 See more particularly on the relationship between globalization and sustain-
able development Baker and McCormick (2004) and Martens and Zywietz (2006, pp.
331–50) as well as Martens (2007, pp. 39–47) and Sands (2000, pp. 369–409). And see
the contributions in Bugge and Voigt (2008).
4 See for example Birnie and Boyle (2002) and Sands (2003). See also the
contributions in Faure and Song (2008) and in Bratspies and Miller (2006).
5 See generally on multi-level governance de Prado (2007) and Follesdal et al.
(2008) and see on multi-level governance and environmental issues especially the
contributions in Winter (2006).
6 See more particularly Porter and Van den Linde (1995, pp. 97–118) and
Copeland and Taylor (2004, pp. 7–71).
7 See for example Vogel (2004, pp. 231–2).
 
formulated concerning this particular relationship. In the latter case, the analy-
sis would involve arguing whether the influence of globalization on environ-
mental issues is desirable or not. In order to be able to provide such a
normative statement, one undoubtedly needs a point of reference.
To the extent that this chapter will provide such a normative indication
concerning the relationship between environmental problems and globaliza-
tion, the reference point used is usually the one provided by economics,
namely efficiency. I consider the economic approach to law generally, and to
environmental law and policy in particular, a very useful methodology not
only to structure particular questions but also to provide an indication of the
desirability of particular developments.8 With this, I of course do not argue
that efficiency is the only criterion that should guide environmental policy.
Other criteria such as the desire to provide a high level of environmental
protection may also play a role at the policy level, for example to examine the
influence of globalization on environmental issues. Still, in that particular case
economic analysis remains useful. It will for example allow indicating
whether the choice of a high level of environmental protection may come at a
(too) high price.
Even though it may in some cases be artificial to separate particular issues
along the lines suggested above, I will try to order the various questions that
could arise along those lines merely because I hope it may provide a frame-
work to structure the otherwise too complex and manifold questions. The
structure is hence merely chosen for reasons of presentation, not always for
contents.
This chapter will on the one hand discuss the relationship between global-
ization and environmental problems generally. However, since that may be
slightly too ambitious and complex, the major focus will, within the general
framework of this project, obviously be on the particular relationship between
globalization and environmental law and policy. Given the general focus of the
other chapters in this volume on the influence of globalization on private
lawmaking, there will equally be a strong focus on private law. However, given
the important influence of regulation in environmental law and policy, many
issues will deal with environmental regulation as well as with private law.
1.3 General Background
The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the general aim of this book, being
to identify particular challenges posed by globalization for environmental law
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8 A summary of the economic approach to environmental law and policy can be
found in Faure and Skogh (2003).
and policy. Hence, some of the more general questions, also indicated in the
introduction to this volume, concerning the relationship between globalization
and private lawmaking will be analysed within the specific context of envi-
ronmental problems.
One particular issue that will play a major role in the globalization debate
generally and hence also for environmental problems is to what extent there is
a ‘lawmaking beyond the nation state’. The challenges posed by this multi-
level governance lead to the institutional questions of who sets the agenda and
who takes decisions on the appropriate remedies for (also transboundary)
environmental harm.9 The general question, being to what extent a shift to
higher levels of governance leads to increasing problems of accountability and
legitimacy, will also be a crucial one in the environmental context. The goal of
this chapter will be to identify the specific issues and topics that arise in that
respect and perhaps to indicate in what direction solutions may be found.
An equally central focus of this chapter will be that, although many prob-
lems to be discussed in this contribution seem ‘global’ in the sense that, for
example, lawmaking emerges from international organization or deals with
transboundary environmental pollution, the problems often have effects for
individuals in private legal relationships. It is more particularly this relation-
ship between the various legal orders (international, regional (such as
European), state and local levels) that poses interesting questions for the way
environmental problems are dealt with in a specific context.
1.4 Structure
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: after this introduction,
the influence of environmental issues on globalization will first be analysed
from a positive perspective (2); next, the influence of environmental issues on
globalization will be analysed from a normative perspective (3). Then, the
influence of globalization on (private) environmental law and policy will be
analysed positively (4) as well as normatively (5). Finally, an indication will
be provided of the particular contribution of environmental problems to the
debate on the influence of globalization on private lawmaking (6).
386 Globalization and private law
9 See for the various possible remedies for transboundary environmental harm
Nollkaemper (2008).
2 INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON
GLOBALIZATION: POSITIVE ANALYSIS
One can easily identify some environmental problems that have shaped, or at
least influenced, the globalization debate. For now, I will simply mention a
few of those issues and mainly be content with describing them; in the next
section (3) an attempt will be made to address some of these developments
from a more normative perspective.
2.1 Increase of Transboundary Pollution
It seems like pushing at an open door to argue that one way in which environ-
mental problems have ‘gone global’ is that pollution problems have increas-
ingly become transboundary.10 To a large extent, this may be the result of an
increased awareness of the transboundary character of environmental pollu-
tion.11 Environmental pollution probably always had a transboundary charac-
ter, but perhaps it is also due to increased technological abilities that the
sources can be traced back to transboundary pollution.12 Originally, the focus
of environmental awareness was on the so-called point source pollution
coming from particular identifiable sources (such as emissions by factories),
in addition to problems for workers13, leading to pollution of the soil and
(local) surface or ground waters. Most likely, already during the time of indus-
trialization, emissions by particular factories caused transboundary air pollu-
tion, but lacking technical abilities we were often prevented from tracking
down the sources of air pollution. In the second half of the last century, the
attention shifted as a result of an increasing awareness that many environ-
mental problems have a transboundary character. Hence, the focus increas-
ingly rested on problems caused by so-called long-range air pollution and acid
rain.14
From an economic perspective, the basic problem was that local industry
exported environmental pollution, leading, at least, to a de facto ‘externaliza-
tion’ of pollution problems. Economists have often argued that the reasons for
Multi-level governance of environmental harm 387
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11 See for a fuller account of the importance of transboundary impacts Handl
(2007).
12 Also Bhagwati (2007) believes that globalization has been driven in an impor-
tant way by technical change.
13 Notice that environmental law in many countries originated from a shift in
attention from safety at work to the so-called external safety around the factory.
14 See for example the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution (LRTAP) and the subsequent protocols.
 
the transboundary character of environmental pollution problems are well
known: local politicians will not have many incentives to act strongly against
polluters who may be able to export large quantities of the pollution outside
the borders of the national territory. Thus the polluting activity could result in
socio-economic benefits for the nation (increased tax revenues and job secu-
rity), whereas the negative effects (referred to as externalities by economists)
are shipped to the neighbouring countries.15 Since politicians primarily need
to be re-elected by the citizens within their particular state, their primary
concern may not be with the transboundary effects of pollution caused by
factories within their nation. In that sense, one could even argue that one
should not be surprised that such an externalization of pollution to other coun-
tries takes place. That problem is as such well known and not new. It has been,
as mentioned in the introduction, the task of international environmental law
to provide remedies against this externalization of pollution. These remedies,
however, emerged long before globalization became an issue on the political
or academic agenda.
There is, however, one particular issue that has definitely changed the polit-
ical and academic agenda, namely what was referred to in the 1990s as global
environmental change and in this century simply as the problem of climate
change. If there is one example of a ‘global’ environmental problem it is
undoubtedly climate change. Not only can sources not be traced back just to
particular polluters in specific nation states, but so-called non point source
pollution (such as aviation) has also largely contributed at least to increased
CO2 emissions and arguably to climate change as well. The example of
climate change immediately shows the difficulty in arguing that there would
be a causal relationship between globalization and a particular environmental
problem. One can undoubtedly argue that climate change is the ultimate exam-
ple of a global environmental problem and in that sense it influences the glob-
alization debate. On the other hand, it is obviously not necessarily (economic)
globalization in the sense of lowering restrictions on trade that would have
caused the climate change problem. For a more in-depth discussion of the
legal aspects of climate change we refer to the relevant literature in that
respect16 and more particularly to Chapter 13 by Spier in this volume.
2.2 Increased Mobility of Products and Services
Another clear example of a relationship between environmental issues and
globalization (even though again the direction of the causality is not that clear)
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15 See Faure and Betlem (2008, pp. 129–91).
16 Johnston (2008); Van Ierland et al. (2003), Stewart and Wiener (2003), Faure
et al. (2003), Douma et al. (2007b) as well as Peeters and Deketelaere (2006).
relates to the mere fact that as a result of technological changes, increased
possibilities of transport, lower transportation costs and so on the mobility of
products, capital, labour and services has strongly intensified. It is precisely
this increased mobility which according to some qualifies as ‘globalization’.
The increased mobility and the corresponding increasing (international) trade
have undoubtedly led to significant welfare gains which have been described
in many economic studies. However, at the same time, many have also pointed
to the fact that with an increased mobility of products and services not only do
the beneficial aspects of these products increasingly travel but also the nega-
tive side-effects, earlier referred to as externalities. Indeed, one aspect is that
the increased mobility not only applies to regular products but also for exam-
ple to waste. The increasing technological possibilities provide inter alia for
producers of waste possibilities to use economies of scale and enable them to
look for the place where, for example, incineration costs (or taxes) may be the
lowest.17 This export of environmental problems, leading effectively to a glob-
alization of trade in pollution (more particularly waste), does not go undis-
puted.
Other examples of this relationship between increased mobility and envi-
ronmental issues can be provided. Particular problems arise, for example,
when products from a country with low environmental (or labour) standards
are imported into countries with higher standards, whereby the question arises
to what extent the higher environmental standards can also be imposed upon
the imported products, which would effectively raise barriers to trade.18
In addition, in some cases, differences in the environmental standards (or in
the pollution absorbing capacity) of countries have led to a mobility of firms.
In that sense, the possibilities of increased mobility have effectively been used
by many polluters who have, according to Tiebout’s theory, ‘voted with their
feet’ and moved particularly polluting activities to other jurisdictions.19 The
increased exodus of, for example, textile firms from Europe towards Southeast
Asia is one important example.20 Some argue that the enlargement towards
Eastern Europe also provides increased possibilities for environmental mobil-
ity of firms in Western Europe to the east.21
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19 See Tiebout (1956).
20 Although this obviously took place not only because of differences in envi-
ronmental standards but also because of differences in labour costs, taxation, costs of
raw material etc.
21 See Faure and Johnston (2009, forthcoming).
The most literal form of an interrelationship between pollution and global-
ization could probably be found in systems where a trading in pollution rights
is allowed. Whereas some economists still considered such a trading system as
an original but rather crazy idea in the 1990s, after some experiments in the
US, emissions trading has gained popularity at the policy level as the main
instrument to fight climate change. Even though there is not yet a full global-
ization in the sense of an international emission trading scheme, there are
important regional emission trading schemes, such as the one for greenhouse
gases in the European Union.22
2.3 Lowering Environmental Quality?
The probably more interesting issue is whether the relationship between glob-
alization and environmental pollution leads also to a lowering of environmen-
tal quality.23 The hypothesis would thus be that the increasing transboundary
character of pollution would lead not only to an increased mobility of pollu-
tants, but also to more pollution and hence to a lowering of environmental
quality. This corresponds with an intuitive feeling, launched for example by
the so-called anti-globalists, that free trade would be the enemy of environ-
mental protection.24 The intuitive appeal of this argument rests on the
economic notion referred to above that states will attempt to externalize envi-
ronmental pollution. If this externalization took place without remedies, more
trade would undoubtedly lead to more pollution.25 Another theoretical back-
ing for this statement is that states would increasingly engage in a competition
for ever lower environmental standards. Since states would desire to attract
industry, they would lower their environmental standards and, since compet-
ing firms would do the same, a prisoner’s dilemma would emerge, resulting in
an overall lowering of environmental quality. It is the well-known problem of
the race to the bottom.26
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22 For an account of the first experiences, see Faure and Peeters (2008).
23 See for a strong statement that economic globalization negatively affects envi-
ronmental quality: Mander (2003); for a more nuanced picture with a review of the
empirical literature see Copeland and Taylor (2004, p. 7 ff.) (arguing inter alia that
increased trade and economic growth also raises environmental quality).
24 Here again, one notices that it is difficult to distinguish between environmen-
tal problems affecting globalization versus globalization influencing environmental
issues. The feeling is often that free trade agreements have a ‘chilling effect’ on domes-
tic regulation to protect public health and the environment, so Wirth (2007, p. 1).
25 For a critical perspective on this ‘transboundary externality’ argument in
favour of centralization see Revesz (1996).
26 For a critical perspective on this race-to-the-bottom rationale for centraliza-
tion see equally Revesz (1992).
Notwithstanding the theoretical appeal, the empirical evidence for this
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is rather weak; at least it depends on the
specific territory where one examines this phenomenon. David Vogel has for
example powerfully argued that there is empirical evidence that states do not
always engage in a race to the bottom, but in some cases in a so-called race to
the top.27 The basic intuition is that export-oriented firms that have to comply
with stringent (environmental) standards abroad will also strive for more strin-
gent standards in their home country. Based on the experience in the state of
California, this is referred to by some as the California effect.28 However,
Princen shows that this California effect (competing for higher environmental
standards) only works with strong public interest groups that collide with the
interests of industry. The intuition here is that export-oriented firms may have
an interest in imposing the stringent standards with which they have to comply
in the export country also domestically, probably partly in an effort to raise
barriers to entry. Their interests may hence coincide with those of green NGOs
that are also (but obviously for different reasons) in favour of more stringent
environmental standards in their home country and thus form a coalition with
industry.
However, when those coalitions do not emerge (and hence no trading up takes
place), there is also a risk that free trade may win from environmental protection.
Empirical evidence depends very much upon the region one considers. For exam-
ple, within the US and Europe, empirical evidence shows that industry does not
relocate to ‘pollution havens’ simply because environmental costs in other
(member) states would be lower.29 However, empirical research also indicates
that environmental costs may be one of the elements taken into consideration by
firms when deciding upon a new location.30 The relevant question is whether the
benefits of moving (being the marginal costs related to the differential in costs of
compliance with environmental standards) outweigh other costs (such as reloca-
tion costs).31 Another issue is of course to what extent environmental costs consti-
tute an important element in total production costs. This may explain why, for
example, for a firm in Germany it may be beneficial to move production to
Indonesia (since marginal cost differences may be substantial) but not to Belgium
(since marginal cost differences may be minimal).
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(1995).
28 See in this respect the interesting doctoral dissertation by Princen where he
has analysed this phenomenon in detail: Princen (2002).
29 See Faure (1998, pp. 171–3).
30 See Jaffe et al. (1995).
31 See Kolstad and Xing (2002) as well as Becker and Henderson (2000) and
Greenstone (2002).
Whether increased ‘globalization’ (in the sense of mobility) of environ-
mental pollution therefore leads to a lowering of environmental quality very
much depends on the particular circumstances and the regions concerned.32
Roughly speaking, one could argue that within large federal systems like the
EU and the US there is hardly a race to the  bottom between (member) states
(leading to a lowering of environmental quality) but that such a race to the
bottom may be realistic in case of mobility from the developed north to the
less developed south.33
3 INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON
GLOBALIZATION: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Again, I should stress that one can debate whether the issues really concern the
influence of environmental issues on globalization or whether it is rather the
reverse. The division presented here is, as was mentioned, merely chosen for
reasons of presentation, not so much for contents.
The normative questions that follow from the relationship between envi-
ronmental issues and globalization which have been identified positively in
Section 2 will now be addressed at a more normative level. Normatively, the
question of course arises regarding to what extent one considers some of the
phenomena resulting from an increased relationship between globalization and
environmental pollution as desirable or not. Without attempting to provide a
final answer to these complicated issues, I will only attempt to identify some
ways in which one could address these problems. This may help in structuring
the research and policy agenda. The increase in the transboundary character of
environmental problems (and thus the globalization of environmental pollu-
tion) undoubtedly leads to questions related to, for example, the institutions
that need to address these globalized environmental problems, the level of
governance at which issues should be addressed and the consequences of the
normative environmental standards to be imposed.
3.1 Multi-Level Governance
A first question at the normative level is, to put it simply, whether the glob-
alization of environmental problems makes a globalization of law neces-
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32 See Faure and Johnston (2009).
33 See in this respect Gupta (2006) who is for that reason very critical of apply-
ing the idea of regulatory competition also in the north–south relationship. For a
detailed overview of the empirical literature in this respect see also Copeland and
Taylor (2004).
 
sary.34 The straightforward argument would be that a globalization of pollu-
tion necessitates a globalization of environmental law.35 Even though it
sounds rather simplistic, the argument may have some support from economic
analysis from two different angles. One angle would be that as soon as pollu-
tion crosses national borders and a risk of an externalization of environmental
pollution thus emerges, a remedy should be found at a higher level to force the
‘pollution exporting’ state towards an internalization of its transboundary
pollution.36 However, even though the argument that some legal remedy is
necessary against this transboundary pollution is undoubtedly valid, the ques-
tion remains as to whether this really should take the form of a centralization
or harmonization of law.
An alternative presented in the literature is simply the transboundary appli-
cation of domestic standards on transboundary pollution.36 There are many
examples of this. In the European context one could notice an important evolu-
tion in the case law of the European Court of Justice allowing victims of trans-
boundary environmental pollution to sue foreign polluters either in the state of
the polluter or in the victim state.38 In the latter case (which is obviously more
favourable for the victim) a foreign polluter would be confronted with an
extra- territorial application of the victim state’s law. For example in the
Netherlands this has led to many cases brought by environmental NGOs and
individual victims against Belgian and French polluters (of the rivers Rhine
and Meuse) effectively claiming the application of Dutch law to pollution
which had its source in Belgium and France respectively.39
However, while these types of remedies40 may work in particular contexts
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34 Many of those issues are also addressed in the contributions in Winter (2006)
and in Follesdal et al. (2008).
35 See Esty and Ivanova (2003).
36 See Van den Bergh (2000, pp. 88–92).
37 This could be done via a liability suit whereby a downstream victim of pollu-
tion sues upstream polluting firms. See on those possibilities Faure and Betlem (2008),
Boyle (2006) and Nollkaemper (1998).
38 This was decided by the European Court of Justice in the well-known ruling
in the Bier case (case 21/76 Bier v Mines de potasse d’Alsace, (1976) ECR 1735,
1748–9: ‘The expression “place where the harmful event occurred”… must be under-
stood as being intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the
place of the event giving rise to it. The result is that the defendant may be sued, at the
option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for the place where the damage occurred or
in the court for the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of the
damage.’
39 See for a detailed discussion of these examples Faure and Betlem (2008, pp.
129–91).
40 Also advocated in many publications by Esty and Geradin. See inter alia Esty
and Geradin (1997, 1998 and 2001).
(like the Belgian–Dutch damage claims) the transboundary application of
domestic standards can, as we will discuss below, to some extent also conflict
with rules concerning free trade, emerging from either regional organizations
(like the EU) or from world trade law. Hence, to some extent, the remedy
against this transboundary pollution may have to come from a standard setting
at a higher legal order. Institutionally, the transboundary character of the pollu-
tion would thus constitute an argument in favour of harmonization of envi-
ronmental law, or at least in favour of a centralization of the decision
making.41
A second related argument would be that when pollution crosses national
borders, a decision-making authority has to be found that is large enough to
deal adequately with the pollution problem. The justification in that particular
case would simply be one of economies of scale: by looking for an authority
which has jurisdiction over the entire territory covering the pollution problem,
substantial savings on transaction costs could be achieved. This type of argu-
ment would hence justify, for example, shifting the standard setting for water
pollution in transboundary rivers like the Meuse or Rhine to a body like the
EU. It would equally justify shifting the decision making for a global envi-
ronmental problem like climate change to an authority with global jurisdiction
like the UN.42
3.2 Shift of Governance for Local Pollution?
The first normative issue I dealt with was the relatively straightforward case
where the pollution crosses national borders. In that case, an argument in
favour of shifting powers to a higher legal order (hence: globalization of pollu-
tion leading to globalization of law) is not that difficult to make. But what if
the pollution is confined within national borders? There are still economic
justifications for shifting powers to a higher legal order (centralization and
eventually harmonization) even if the pollution problem remains local, but the
case is weaker. I discuss this from two separate angles.
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alternative is to shift powers (e.g. because of economies of scale advantages) to a
higher level but to have the central authority impose differentiated standards. See in
this respect inter alia Arcuri (2001, p. 37).
42 Hence, the fact that the UN dealt with the climate change problem in the well-
known Framework Convention on Climate Change has a strong economic justification
in this economies of scale argument.
3.2.1 Danger of a race to the bottom?
Above, I have already introduced the race to the bottom as one phenomenon
that could explain a lowering of environmental quality resulting from an
increased mobility of products, firms and pollutants. The resulting question is
to what extent this race to the bottom may justify a centralization of the deci-
sion making, or at least a shift of the decision making to a higher legal order.
The literature in this respect usually indicates that this all depends on
whether there is indeed empirical evidence of such a race to the bottom (which
would then justify centralization).43 As I have already indicated above,44 the
empirical evidence in that respect is not that clear. In cases where there would
be evidence of a so-called California effect (precisely the reverse of the race
to the bottom) there would not be any argument in favour of centralization. In
the other case (competing for lower environmental standards), the question
arises as to in which direction the empirical evidence goes. I have already indi-
cated that within the EU and the US evidence of such a race to pollution
havens is weak, even though after enlargement the EU may be confronted with
an environmental race to Eastern Europe (all depending upon whether the
Eastern European Member States have to comply with the acquis communau-
taire45 and whether the European Commission will also actually enforce the
stringent EU standards upon the new Member States).
The strongest empirical evidence rather comes from a race towards pollu-
tion havens in developing countries, which normatively therefore constitutes a
pretty strong argument in favour of a regulation of environmental standards in
developing countries. The difficulty in that particular case is, however, that a
high level of environmental protection may not correspond to the preferences
of citizens in low-income countries, who may prefer to give priority to
economic development.46 Forcing developing low-income countries to
comply with high levels of environmental protection may thus constitute a
type of undesirable paternalism from the north.
Recent empirical evidence shows that the stringency of environmental regu-
lation may at least have an influence on the ex ante decision of firms concern-
ing location. Moreover, Esty and Gerardin have shown that, even in cases
where there is no race to the bottom in the sense of a relocation to pollution
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havens, the fear of losing local industry to competing states with lower envi-
ronmental standards could lead to a so-called ‘regulatory chill’, preventing the
state from imposing more stringent environmental standards, because of the
fear of a relocation.47
An argument which has sometimes been advanced in the EU in this respect
is that environmental standards should be harmonized in order to create a level
playing field for industry. The argument is sometimes referred to as the need
for a ‘harmonization of marketing conditions’.48 Law and economics scholars
have, however, powerfully shown that such a harmonization of marketing
conditions cannot justify the need for harmonization of laws. The simple
reason is that marketing conditions always differ (if not, there would be no
trade) and, even if all legal rules were harmonized, marketing conditions
would still be different because of totally other reasons (like differences in
labour costs, tax level, unionization of the labour force, availability of natural
resources and so on).49 The only relevant question is therefore whether these
differences constitute a barrier to interstate trade, which is seldom the case.50
3.2.2 The trade–environment dispute
In fact, the mirror image of the race to the bottom (whereby states would
engage in an inefficient race towards lowering environmental standards) is the
danger that some nations may impose very stringent domestic environmental
standards. Since these will obviously also apply to imported products, they can
endanger free trade. It is the well-known conflict between free trade and envi-
ronmental concerns that has led to many regulations and publications both
within federal systems (US, EU) and at the international level (WTO law).51
The bottom line is that most regulatory solutions start from a distrust of
(member) states that use environmental reasons to, for example, prohibit the
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49 See also Ogus (2004, pp. 177–9) and Revesz (1997).
50 See generally Esty (1999).
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Agreement. For a commentary see Scott (2007) and Van den Bossche and Prévost
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import of supposedly polluting products.52 The obvious danger that can
always arise in those situations is that the environmental reasoning will be
abused simply to favour local industry. Hence, many of the free trade agree-
ments start from the negative position, namely that they prohibit local protec-
tionism, even if it were for environmental reasons (although a genuine use of
the environmental argument to ban polluting products may under some
circumstances be accepted).53
Looking at the cases, legal doctrine has shown that the approaches seem to
differ somewhat between the EU, the US and the WTO level. To start with the
last: commentators have indicated that the tuna–dolphin case seems to indicate
that the free trade interests have won. Indeed the US lost a challenge initiated
by Mexico under the auspices of the predecessor of the WTO:54 the US ban on
Mexican tuna (which was legitimately caught in a way that killed air-breath-
ing dolphins) was considered an illegal discrimination against Mexican tuna.
This US embargo amounted to an attempt of the US to dictate Mexico’s envi-
ronmental policy, which could have serious disruptive effects on international
trade.55 The same seems to a large extent to be the case in US national law
where the Supreme Court has decided that state laws may not create barriers
to an interstate trade of waste.56
The EU approach, on the other hand, seems to be more flexible in the sense
that it allows more room to call on environmental arguments to justify protec-
tive measures.57 For example, in the Danish bottle case a recycling system
imposed by Denmark and clearly imposing costs on (also foreign) producers
(thus potentially restricting trade) was allowed, given the environmental inter-
ests the Danish wished to achieve with the particular recycling system.58
Whereas the Danish bottle measure was still non-discriminatory, the Walloon
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region in Belgium went a lot further by simply prohibiting the import of
foreign waste into the Walloon region. Even though this measure was clearly
discriminatory, the European Court of Justice (to the surprise of many
commentators) upheld the measure.59 It called on the so-called proximity prin-
ciple as a justification, arguing that the waste should in principle be treated or
recycled as close as possible to the place where it has been produced.60 Hence
the Walloon government was allowed to ban foreign waste even though the
measure was clearly discriminatory.
Commentators hold that in principle multilateral environmental agreements
should solve these problems.61 Moreover, others stress that one major problem
in all of these trade–environment conflicts is scientific uncertainty.62 Often
one country or legal system bans the import of particular products (such as
GMOs or beef with hormones) because of particular food safety or environ-
mental concerns, whereas the exporting country holds that these risks are
either non-existent or largely exaggerated so that the importing state is again
mainly abusing the environmental or health concern to ban imports, favouring
local industry. That the latter concern may always play a role will be no
surprise if one just remembers, for example, how quick the French were in
banning British beef during the BSE crisis, obviously favouring local produc-
ers.63
Commentators indicate that the key to solving this conflict is to evaluate the
validity of the local arguments (and especially the scientific uncertainty
surrounding it) on the basis of expert science. However, since many of the
recent conflicts have also shown that experts may strongly disagree as well,
one key issue is to determine the procedure by which these kinds of decisions
are taken (including, for example, whether one relies only on expert evidence
or potentially also on public participation).64 Another issue is how, after risks
have been appropriately assessed, whether one can find an agreement on the
contents, notwithstanding different preferences and differences in risk aver-
sion and perception.
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62 See Wiener (2004) and Zander (2009).
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Increasingly, commentators also ask the question whether, more specifi-
cally in issues relating to international trade, the WTO appellate body is the
appropriate forum to answer many of these rather complicated technical
issues.
3.3 Mobility of Products, Firms and Services
When dealing with the relationship between environmental problems and
globalization there are of course also a number of normative issues involved,
which to some extent go beyond the economic approach on which I have so
far largely relied. One of the consequences of an increased mobility of
polluters and pollutants may be that pollution is to a large extent exported to
communities who do not reap the benefits from the social activities that cause
the pollution. These kinds of issues are in the literature discussed under the
heading of ‘environmental justice’.65 Of course these complicated questions
do not generate simple answers, but these environmental justice concerns will
undoubtedly also (and rightly so) strongly determine the policy agenda
concerning the relationship between environmental pollution and globaliza-
tion. Just a few examples illustrate the relevance of these environmental
justice issues.
One obvious question is to what extent competition and economies of scale
can determine where to locate particular polluting industries. For example, in
the north–south dialogue an economic approach may well propose the ship-
ment of hazardous waste to the Sahara desert, where it could probably be
stored at lower costs than the dismantling in, say, Europe would cost.66
However, such a race to the bottom to a pollution haven understandably raises
important environmental justice concerns that may even trump the economic
arguments.67
Similar questions also arise with respect to the application of environmen-
tal standards in developing countries. The question arises for example as to
whether in the environmental protection–economic development trade-off
policy makers should always respect the preferences of the citizens. This
would lead to the conclusion that the inhabitants of, say, Togo would, given
their higher preference for economic development than for environmental
protection (and their lower income), probably not be prepared to pay the same
high price for environmental protection as the citizens of, for example,
Germany. A strict economic reasoning would thus lead to a differentiation of
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environmental standards.68 However, justice notions may, for example, well
lead companies that export their activities from Germany to Togo to adopt the
same environmental standards in Togo as in Germany. Such a duty to export
domestic high-level environmental standards to developing countries is some-
times defended under the heading of corporate social responsibility.69
However, one has to be very careful about accepting these justice argu-
ments at face value, the problem being that they can lead to paternalism
whereby developing countries are forced to accept a higher level of environ-
mental protection on the basis of an interpretation of environmental justice in
the north. The result may be that prices of products and services in developing
countries in the south increase to an extent that does not correspond to their
preferences. The crucial question is therefore who defines the precise contents
of this environmental justice and whether these justice concerns can eventu-
ally set aside preferences of citizens.
4 INFLUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION ON (PRIVATE)
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POSITIVE ANALYSIS
Again I should stress that the many aspects of the relationship between glob-
alization and environmental pollution addressed in this chapter are strongly
related. For reasons of presentation I will now focus on some consequences of
globalization for (private) environmental law. With globalization in this partic-
ular context I refer both to economic globalization and to the fact that envi-
ronmental problems have assumed a more global nature, as I discussed in
Section 3. Given the focus of this book on the relationship between globaliza-
tion and private law I will try to focus on some consequences for private envi-
ronmental law, even though it may be clear that many of these consequences
apply to other aspects of environmental law as well.
4.1 Institutional
One undeniable consequence of globalization for environmental law is that a
shift has occurred towards more globalized lawmaking. Above I indicated that
the transboundary character of the pollution problem merits the search for a
level of governance by an institution with authority broad enough to cover the
pollution problem to be regulated. That is effectively what to a large extent has
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happened. In the area of environmental law one can undoubtedly notice a trend
towards ‘institutional globalization’ in the sense of a shift of powers towards
higher legal orders. For example, in regional organizations like the EU one can
notice an increasing shift of competences, more particularly as far as environ-
mental law is concerned, towards the regional level. A recent research calcu-
lated that in the Netherlands approximately 66 per cent of Dutch
environmental law consists of EU environmental law.70 Hence, one simple
consequence of the shift of powers to a higher legal order (resulting from the
globalization of environmental problems) is that the national law of the nation
state is increasingly affected and influenced by law which emerges from
higher legal orders (in Europe, the EU).
Generally one can argue that the institutional globalization leads to a multi-
level governance (lawmaking at different levels of government). In addition to
environmental law generated by the nation state, one increasingly notices
lawmaking by:
• international organizations, to deal with transboundary pollution prob-
lems, for example, the UN for climate change, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) for marine oil pollution and the Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) for nuclear liability
• regional organizations like the EU.71
A consequence of the shift of powers to these higher legal orders is that the
norms generated at these higher levels subsequently have to be transposed or
implemented (of course depending upon the national legal system) in national
law, which raises particular problems such as lacking compliance (with inter-
national environmental agreements)72 or lacking implementation (in the case
of EU law).73
4.2 Procedural
4.2.1 Integration of various legal spheres
The shift of powers to the higher legal orders mentioned above, as well as the
multi-level governance of environmental problems (referring to the fact that
norms are generated at the international, regional – for example, EU–and
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national levels), leads to specific procedural issues and changes in the way
traditional environmental law is applied. One can argue that this globalization
has changed the way in which the judiciary deals with (private) environmen-
tal law.74 One consequence of the fact that standard-setting powers have often
been shifted to higher levels (international or regional) is that the norms gener-
ated at these higher levels will also influence the adjudication in particular
cases under national law.75 Since the national law that the judge is applying in
the private legal relationships may often emerge from the international level,
questions can arise with respect to the correct transposition or implementation
of these norms in national law.76 The traditional tasks of the judges’s judicial
review have hence changed to include also the compatibility of national law
with international (and European) legal rules.77
This raises important questions with respect to the application and validity
of these international norms in private legal relationships. Of course the extent
to which these international norms can and do play a role in private legal rela-
tionships may well strongly depend upon the nature of the international legal
norm and the legal system in which they are applied. However, increasingly
one can notice that (in various forms and to various extents) these international
norms also affect the adjudication by national judges of private legal relation-
ships. One example is the fact that environmental human rights play an
increasingly important role in national environmental law as well. The
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly accepted that particularly
serious cases of environmental pollution can constitute a violation of the right
to life.78
4.2.2 Effect of international law on private law
Within this setting of a multi-level environmental governance, questions also
arise not only as to whether national judges are bound by higher legal norms
(within the framework of judicial review) but also as to the extent to which
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individuals (such as victims) can call on these higher legal norms or whether
they can be held against particular individuals (polluters). The history of envi-
ronmental human rights shows that these rights can provide individual victims
of environmental pollution with a direct right of action, even if not granted in
the national legal system.
The general rule in international law was that international legal rules only
bind states and not individuals. Therefore the District Court of Bonn could
decide that an individual victim (a farmer) of the Chernobyl incident could not
sue the Soviet Union for a violation of international law.79 There have been
situations, however, where norms of international law have played a role in
transboundary liability suits. An example is a suit brought by Dutch market
gardeners in the 1970s against the Mines de Potasse d’Alsace (MDPA) for
discharging too much salt into the river Rhine, so that they could not make use
of the water of the Rhine any more. In a remarkable judgment, the District
Court of Rotterdam held that, since no rule of national law could be found to
decide this case, it had to turn to unwritten international law and hence it
applied the principle that no state can use its territory for activities that cause
harm to another state.80 The District Court of Rotterdam thereby explicitly
refers to the well-known Trail Smelter Case, which applied the so-called good
neighbourliness principle.81 These cases show that the traditional boundaries
between international and national environmental law become increasingly
blurry, since in various ways the international level clearly influences adjudi-
cation at the national level as well.82
4.2.3 Effect on public participation
International environmental norms have also clearly affected the administra-
tion of environmental justice in national legal systems. One can easily name
various international conventions related to access to justice that provide
victims in national (member) states increasingly with rights to, for example,
challenge administrative decisions that may negatively affect their interests. In
this respect one should not merely point to conventions with respect to the
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Yearbook of International Law, 1984, volume 15, 471.
81 For a discussion of this Trail Smelter Arbitration see Bratspies and Miller
(2006) and Sands (2003, pp. 241–2 and pp. 318–19).
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transboundary environmental impact assessment83 but also to the Aarhus
Convention with respect to public participation.84
Interestingly, some commentators point to the fact that the implementation
of some international norms and decisions (more particularly following from
the WTO appellate body) may endanger national rights with respect to public
participation. Whereas on the basis of national (in this case US) law victims
would enjoy broad rights of public participation, the (international) obligation
to comply with a decision of an international body can in some instances lead
to the duty of the state to implement these decisions, thereby infringing upon
rights of public participation which national law would normally grant the citi-
zens.85
4.2.4 Tendency toward consensual solutions?
Another interesting issue of a procedural nature is that one can increasingly
notice a tendency towards bargaining and alternative dispute resolution as a
solution to environmental conflicts. For example, with respect to the rivers
Rhine and Scheldt, international commissions have recently been given
important tasks to improve the quality of the water in those transboundary
rivers on the basis of a procedure of consultation and large stakeholder
involvement.86 As far as the river Rhine is concerned, this consensual
approach had a positive result in the sense that the target of getting the salmon
back into the river Rhine was achieved.87
Also at the international level one can notice that transboundary environ-
mental disputes are almost never solved by the judiciary. An environmental
chamber of the International Court of Justice, instituted in 1993, was never
used for that purpose and was therefore not reinstituted from 2006.88 The deci-
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sions taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) also show the reluctance of the
judges to come to firm decisions providing a final solution to the entitlements
of both parties. In many cases, the judges remarkably provide a few indica-
tions on how to resolve the dispute and then send the parties back to the nego-
tiation table.89
Hence, the shift towards a higher legal order and the globalization of envi-
ronmental problems has apparently also led to a different role of the judiciary
in resolving (transboundary) environmental disputes: rather than providing
firm and final entitlements (as is often the case in national environmental
disputes) in the transboundary context, the judiciary seems more cautious and
tends to stimulate bargaining between parties and consensual solutions.90
4.3 Contents
The question one could of course ask is whether the globalization of lawmak-
ing in the environmental area has also led to a convergence in the sense of a
harmonization of environmental law. Centralization in the sense of shifting
powers to a higher legal order should indeed not necessarily be equated with
harmonization. Theoretically the central authority could also decide to issue
differentiated environmental standards that take into account, for example,
differing local environmental conditions.91
However, the shift to a higher legal order (resulting from the globalization
of environmental pollution) has in almost all cases led to a harmonization of
lawmaking as well. Centralization has therefore in this environmental area
often in practice meant harmonization. Of course it may depend upon the
particular area and the international legal norm concerned whether there still
is room for differentiation. However, in most cases, whether the norm
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emanates from an international organization (such as the UN, IMO,92 NEA93)
or from a regional one (EU) there may be some scope left for differentiation.94
However, especially at the EU level, one increasingly gets the impression that
the scope for differentiation is relatively limited and that the policy objective
is to strive for a convergence of norms.95
Even though convergence through harmonization of legal rules may often
be the policy objective, that does of course not mean that that objective can
always be realized. In many cases European directives, for example, will
provide a framework that has to implemented in national Member States.
Given the large differences in legal cultures of the Member States (and also in
legal language), even one single text may lead to different interpretations and
to differentiation between Member States.96
5 INFLUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION ON (PRIVATE)
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
I will now address the same issues that were discussed from a positive
perspective in Section 4 in a more normative analysis. Again, the aim is not to
provide a final answer on how to solve the challenges identified in Section 4,
but rather to provide a framework within which these questions could be
addressed. To an important extent this will again rely on the economic analy-
sis of law, although some other approaches may be used as well.
5.1 Institutional
5.5.1 Lawmaking beyond the nation state
In Section 4 we addressed a general feature of the relationship between 
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globalization and environmental law, namely that powers of lawmaking are
increasingly shifted, in the words of Smits, ‘beyond the nation state’.97 One
can notice shifts to international organizations (like the UN, IMO or NEA, but
many others could be mentioned as well) or to regional organizations such as
the EU. It is no surprise that the further away from the citizens concerned the
decision making takes place, the greater the risk is that a countervailing power,
taking into account the interests of the citizens, may be lacking. The literature
in many domains, but also in the environmental area, has held that the shift of
powers to higher legal orders (in other words centralization) may lead to a few
of the questions central to this entire volume:
• Legitimacy: to what extent do international organizations have democ-
ratic legitimacy for their decisions?98 That problem will more particu-
larly emerge when environmental standards are set not by international
organizations but by private (often industry related) organizations as
well.
• Accountability: to what extent can politicians or bureaucrats that take
decisions on environmental standards in international or regional orga-
nizations be held accountable for their decisions, for example by parlia-
ments or other institutions representing the voice of the citizens?99
• Transparency: to what extent does decision making at the international
or regional level take place in a transparent way, so that citizens can
verify how a particular decision concerning an environmental standard
was taken, which interests have played a role and why the decision was
made to weigh the interests involved in a particular way, leading to the
environmental standard concerned?
5.1.2 Victim and environmental protection doubtful
Many examples have been advanced in the literature showing that in the envi-
ronmental area international organizations often take decisions where the
legitimacy is doubtful, accountability is lacking and a transparency on how the
decision was made is largely absent. Examples can be found in the area of the
liability of the licensee of a nuclear power plant for a nuclear accident and the
liability of the tanker owner for marine oil pollution. In both cases, interna-
tional organizations (the IMO in the maritime area; the NEA and the
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear field) created
international conventions in the 1960s which are largely beneficial for the
particular industries: liability is strict, channelled to the operator or the tanker
owner (thus excluding the liability of other parties potentially contributing to
the risk).100 Most importantly: the liability is limited by imposing a financial
cap on the damages due by the potential injurer. This deviates from the normal
rules of tort law and can thus constitute an important benefit (in fact a subsidy)
to the industry concerned. Legal commentators have therefore held that in both
areas treaties were created that largely benefited the interests of industry and
only to a very limited extent addressed environmental concerns or concerns of
victims.101
The reason for this imbalance has equally been indicated in the literature:
in the lawmaking process within these international organizations there was
(at least at the time when they were being created) a lack of a countervailing
power representing the interests, for example, of victims or of the environment
as such. Given the superior expertise of the regulated industries involved (the
nuclear and the shipping industry respectively), it is clear that they could
easily influence (via their national representatives, present at the negotiation
table) the outcome of the treaties. It is striking in that respect that the outcome
of the negotiations concerning the nuclear liability conventions is even more
favourable for industry than the outcome in the civil liability convention with
respect to marine oil pollution (regulating the liability of tanker owners). In the
nuclear liability field, a countervailing power (for example, representing
potential victims or non-nuclearized states) was absent, whereas in the
maritime field the interests of the various states concerned do not all go in the
same direction, since some states may be primarily maritime states (thus
having a large interest in protecting the maritime industry) whereas others may
be mostly the coastal states potentially affected by marine pollution.
Moreover, in the maritime area not only the interest of the maritime industry
is involved but also that of the oil industry, to which the maritime industry
would like to shift part of the responsibility.102
It is also striking that, for example, where decisions concerning the liabil-
ity in the same areas were not taken by international organizations but at a
national level, the liability of the nuclear operator and the tanker owner respec-
tively was surprisingly higher. A typical example in that respect is of course
the case of the US. The US was always actively involved in negotiating the
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international conventions, more particularly because this would serve its inter-
ests.103
Originally, this also provided a limitation on the liability of the operator of
the nuclear power plant, but later the regime changed, as a result of which the
Price-Anderson Act is much more favourable today than the international
regime: substantially higher amounts for compensation are generated (roughly
ten billion US dollars in the US regime versus one billion in the international
regime) and public funding in the US regime is totally excluded.104 A similar
story could be told as far as the liability for the oil pollution risk is concerned:
instead of joining the international conventions, the US created the Oil
Pollution Act which, again, is much more favourable (in the sense of no limits
on the liability and higher amounts of compensation) than the international
regime.105
5.1.3 Green treaties or protectionism?
These examples show (and many others could be provided) that shifting
powers to higher legal orders may lead to problems of accountability and
transparency, thus allowing a greater influence of industrial interests, leading
to a lower quality environmental standard. However, in some cases the reverse
may be true, in the sense that industrial lobbying may lead to the imposition
of inefficiently stringent environmental standards. That is the case more
particularly when standards are used to create barriers to entry, thus limiting
competition on the market. Typical examples of this protectionism can be
found in the EU, where industry within ‘green’ Member States may typically
lobby in favour of the imposition of stringent (but sometimes inefficient) stan-
dards at the EU level. The reason is that they already have to comply with
stringent domestic environmental standards and may thus have an interest in
imposing those at the EU-wide level as well. It may give the opportunity to
erect barriers to entry, for example to southern competitors who are probably
not able (and may not need) these stringent environmental standards.106
Similar problems may also arise at the national level. In most legal systems
the executive has the treaty-making power. A shift to a higher level of gover-
nance (more particularly to international organizations) can thus at the national
level lead to a more limited role of parliaments. In some cases they merely have
the power to confirm or reject the treaty negotiated by the executive but not to
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influence its contents.107 This general problem of the lack of democratic legit-
imacy of international lawmaking has of course often been mentioned and, as
was just shown, plays a role in environmental cases as well.108
5.1.4 Limited public participation
The current shift of powers to the higher legal order may lead to limited public
participation for the citizens concerned in various ways. First, international
organizations may not have involvement of the civil society (like environ-
mental NGOs) in the decision-making process to the same extent as would be
the case at the national level. In this respect the situation has of course largely
changed compared with the 1960s, when the conventions concerning nuclear
liability and marine oil pollution (referred to above) were drafted. Many inter-
national organizations now allow for a large stakeholder involvement in the
decision-making process,109 but important differences still exist between the
various international regimes concerned. Second, the influence of civil society
is as such, as a result of the shift to a higher legal order, also limited for the
simple reason that there is less to decide at the local level. One notices that,
for example, when within national Member States decisions have to be taken
on environmental standards, the debate often ends with the statement by the
executive that these are international obligations that have to be implemented
at the national (local) level. This limits the room for democratic control by
parliament, but also for public participation or NGO involvement when setting
these standards at the local level.
To an important extent, the shift of powers to the higher legal order (even
though necessary as far as transboundary pollution is concerned) may thus not
be totally unproblematic. To the extent that there is a lack of transparency and
accountability, industrial interest groups may have more possibilities for
successful lobbying and it is easier (given the lack of transparency) for politi-
cians to provide what the interest groups demand. This may inevitably have a
negative consequence for the quality of environmental standards.
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5.1.5 Shift problematic
It seems as if this creates a dilemma: the normative answer to these problems
is obviously not to shift back powers to local institutions. Indeed, above I have
indicated that to the extent that environmental problems cross national borders
it makes absolute sense to shift powers to a higher legal order.110 The well-
known saying ‘global problems need global solutions’ makes some sense in
this respect. However, it was equally indicated that for a variety of reasons
(mostly because it serves the interests of the industry involved and perhaps
some bureaucrats in regional or international organizations as well) more
powers are shifted to the international level than would be warranted on
economic grounds. This is more particularly the case when powers are shifted
to a higher level for pollution problems whose consequences are confined
within the borders of the Member States.
The race to the bottom and the ‘harmonization of marketing conditions’ are
then advanced as reasons for shifting powers to higher legal orders, but I indi-
cated that these reasons are both theoretically and empirically very weak.111
That may be a reason to be slightly more careful with shifting lawmaking
powers to higher levels when transboundary pollution is not at stake. Given
the danger of a lack of transparency and a strong influence of industrial inter-
est groups at the international level, it may constitute yet another argument in
favour of decentralization where centralization is not absolutely necessary on
economic grounds.112 But even in cases where the transboundary character of
the pollution problems merits a shift to a higher legal order, problems may still
arise, especially when the civil society has not been involved in the decision
making. This is more particularly a problem since, while decision making can
take place at a higher legal order, implementation has ultimately to take place
at the local level (following yet another popular one-liner ‘think globally, act
locally’).
5.1.6 Possible remedies
There may be obvious remedies to these problems (although not simple to
implement in practice):
• One remedy would consist of seriously rethinking the shift of powers to
higher legal orders and limiting this to the cases where centralization is
needed on economic grounds (more particularly when there is a trans-
boundary externality or empirical proof of a race to the bottom).
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• Second, one could work towards increased transparency at the interna-
tional level as well.113 This would in public choice terms increase the
costs of lobbying by interest groups. If the public at large can (as a result
of increased transparency) notice that politicians are in fact favouring
interest groups, lobbying becomes more difficult and there is a greater
likelihood that environmental standards are set in the public interest.
• Third, it is obvious that the involvement of the civil society and public
participation in general (also at the international level) can increase the
quality of the decision making. By allowing in environmental NGOs
with strong commitment and expertise in the environmental field, a seri-
ous counterweight against lobbying by industry can be provided.
These normative solutions are obviously not new. One can now increas-
ingly notice that in more recent environmental treaty regimes there is indeed
more transparency and a greater stakeholder involvement. It is the first
remedy, implying that when pollution problems do not cross national borders
there may be strong arguments in favour of decentralization rather than
centralization, that seems to be the most difficult one to be implemented in
practice. This may, to some extent, be due to the fact that bureaucrats in inter-
national organizations (and regional ones like the EU) of course also have a
strong interest in continuing the shift of powers to higher legal orders since it
confirms their authority and power. To a large extent the fact that more central-
ization takes place than is strictly needed (for example, in Europe) can be
explained by the strong powers of the bureaucracy involved.
5.2 Procedural
5.2.1 Distinction international–national becomes blurry
Above, we have already indicated that one consequence of the ‘globalization
of law’ is that norms set by regional or international organizations increasingly
play a role in private legal disputes in national states as well. Moreover, the
national judge will often be called to examine whether national law corre-
sponds with these supranational norms.114 Hence, also the contents of judicial
review have changed.
There seems to be an interesting shift of paradigm in the relationship
between national and international law in the sense that the old dogma that
international law is only binding upon the national states (in a broad sense) is
changing as well. Above we referred to the decision of the District Court of
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Bonn, refusing to apply international law in a dispute between a German
farmer and the Soviet Union. However, the District Court of Rotterdam had no
difficulty in calling on international law in a private legal dispute between
market gardeners in the Netherlands and the Alsacian salt mines in France.
Perhaps this constitutes a paradigm shift whereby the worlds of national and
international law are no longer so strongly separated.115 The result would be
that international law would not only play a role after appropriate transposi-
tion in member states, but that under certain circumstances citizens may also
directly call on (self-execution) provisions in international legal treaties.116
5.2.2 Successful bargaining?
An interesting tendency described above is that international disputes are
increasingly settled through bargaining and negotiations rather than by allo-
cating firm and definite entitlements. There may be a strong economic logic
for this: the judiciary may well lack the necessary information to determine
entitlements in a final way. Moreover, there is a likelihood that when entitle-
ments are wrongly allocated, negotiations will (as a result of strategic behav-
iour by states) not be possible and inefficiencies may emerge.
Several examples were provided above showing that consensual solutions
are increasingly used to solve international disputes. Also the judiciary seems
in many cases to send the parties back to the negotiation table, merely provid-
ing them with some indications on how to solve the dispute. That may thus be
a strategy to facilitate efficient bargaining.117
At first blush, there seems to be some empirical evidence that these consen-
sual solutions are, at least as far as the resolution of transboundary environ-
mental pollution is concerned, effective.118 Interestingly, there is some
empirical evidence that the consensual solution chosen in the river Rhine case
(through the Rhine Commission) generated better ecological results than a
regulatory (command and control) approach followed in the Great Lakes case
in the US.119
However, one still has to be careful: the mere fact that there now are a few
examples where the consensual solution may have worked should not imme-
diately lead to a generalization of conclusions. One problem that still remains
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is that these ‘softer’ consensual solutions may lack enforcement teeth in case
of non-compliance.120
5.3 Contents: Differentiation of Standards
The policy logic so far has always been that, since transboundary environ-
mental problems require transboundary solutions, a centralization of decision
making is needed. Moreover, the centralization has in practice almost always
automatically been equated with a harmonization of environmental standards.
This leads to the normative question regarding to what extent a total conver-
gence of environmental standards is indeed desirable. There is an important
strand of law and economics literature121 holding that (in the absence of trans-
boundary externalities and empirical evidence of a race to the bottom) there
should still be room for divergence. The arguments in favour of divergence, in
the environmental field implying a differentiation of environmental standards,
can be based on a variety of grounds. First of all, with respect to environmen-
tal problems, location specific circumstances are always different. Hence,
there can be a strong technical reason to adapt standards to varying location
specific circumstances. Second, the legal cultures are also strongly divergent.
Many have, moreover, indicated that even if one were to harmonize law
formally this would not necessarily lead to a convergence in practice. The
reason is that even a similar wording (for example, imposed by a European
directive) may be differently interpreted in different (member) states, taking
into account their own legal culture.122
Moreover, harmonization of law in practice often means that particular
standards representing the legal cultural values of a majority (or of the
strongest players) will be imposed. In practice, this may mean that more
particularly in a globalizing world harmonization would not respect differing
values in the multicultural society.
On the contrary, many legal and economic scholars have pointed to the
advantages of differentiation. This could lead to competition between legal
orders. This competition can have the advantage that learning processes occur
whereby legislators can benefit from various experiences in different legal
systems.123 That benefit would be lost if the monopoly of one harmonized
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legal system were imposed. A similar argument in favour of divergence has
been strongly presented by Smits in many publications. He argues in favour of
diversity, especially in the area of private law, maintaining that parties should
(more particularly in contract law) have the possibility to choose from a vari-
ety of legal solutions.124
The conclusion is therefore straightforward: from this economic but also
legal perspective globalization of law should not necessarily lead to a global-
ization of (environmental) standards but could lead to a differentiation, taking
into account differing preferences, cultures and location specific circum-
stances.
6 CONTRIBUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TO THE
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE
6.1 Environmental Issues that Shape the Globalization Debate
As a summary, and by way of conclusion, an attempt can be made to indicate
how environmental problems contribute to the debate on the influence of glob-
alization on private law.
One can certainly argue that environmental problems have played an
important role in that debate, since many of the legal issues related to global-
ization more particularly play a role with regard to environmental problems.
One example is the issue of multi-level governance, that is, the question of at
what level of governance decisions should be taken and how these various
levels mutually interact. Given the inherent transboundary character of envi-
ronmental problems, environmental issues have certainly influenced the
debate on the optimal level of decision making.
Another area where environmental issues have shaped the debate is the
well-known question (that has led to an abundant literature) of how free trade
can be reconciled with environmental concerns.
6.2 Influence of Globalization of Environmental Private Law
It is also not difficult to state that globalization has had a clear influence on
private legal relationships, including in the environmental area. One can for
example point to international conventions (like Aarhus) that promote envi-
ronmental rights, access to justice and information, and public participation.
These are undoubtedly examples of international conventions that have had a
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positive influence on public participation. To the extent that these international
conventions are regarded as an element of globalization, this could be judged
a positive result.
On the other hand, I have equally indicated that many developments result-
ing from this globalization (more particularly the shift to higher legal orders)
undoubtedly also have a negative effect as far as the involvement of civil soci-
ety is concerned, since decision making takes place further away from the citi-
zens concerned. The role of national parliaments or local authorities is then
often reduced to implementing international obligations. Here, one can
undoubtedly argue that the increasing shift to higher legal orders (resulting
from globalization) has led to problems of accountability, transparency and
democratic legitimacy of (environmental) decision making.
Another aspect that environmentalists would undoubtedly consider a nega-
tive consequence of globalization is that local (state) laws protecting the envi-
ronment can in some cases be set aside for violating rules of free trade. It is a
well-known criticism of WTO law by anti-globalists. Also, the interpretation
of the US Commerce Clause by the Supreme Court shows that trade concerns
often win over environmental concerns. Only the case law of the European
Court of Justice seems to give more room to environmental concerns, even
when this limits free trade in a discriminatory way. However, this case law
certainly does not go undisputed.
6.3 Many Unresolved Issues…
A brief look at the way in which globalization and environmental legal issues
interrelate shows that there are many unresolved issues that need further atten-
tion. In that sense the environmental issues can help to shape the research
agenda. To mention just a few:
• There is undoubtedly a need to increase the transparency of decision
making and the accountability of international institutions responsible
for drafting international environmental standards. Important steps have
already been taken in this respect (more particularly in the climate
change regime), but a lot still remains to be improved.
• More generally, the accountability and democratic legitimacy of foreign
policy affecting environmental issues needs to be increased. The
involvement of stakeholders and parliament at an early stage of the deci-
sion making needs to be improved.
• The level of the decision making in a multi-level governance setting
needs to be rethought: there seems to be too large a shift of powers to
the regional/international level, including in cases where this may not be
strictly needed. Possibilities of combining centralization (where this is
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needed) on the one hand with the setting of differentiated norms on the
other hand also need to be further explored.
• In order to increase the respect for the rule of law and the accountabil-
ity of decision-makers at the international level, access to justice, public
participation and the involvement of civil society could be further
improved.
• The framework for striking the balance between free trade and environ-
mental concerns also merits further research. This is particularly the
case when there is scientific uncertainty, which raises the question of
who shall take decisions on the extent to which environmental concerns
can trump free trade. The question also arises regarding to what extent
these decisions can/should only be based on scientific evidence and to
what extent public participation is needed as well.
6.4 … Need Multidisciplinary Research!
It may be clear that answering some of these questions goes beyond the scope of
legal research and may need the involvement of other disciplines. For example:
• Economists may be needed to assist in determining how to set efficient
standards and to determine what is (within a multi-level governance
setting) an optimal level of decision making.
• Social scientists are needed to assist in explaining how an involvement
of civil society, public participation and better access to justice can be
guaranteed, but also how standards can be set in a multicultural setting,
respecting differences in preferences and (legal) cultures.
• Political scientists have important insights into how to provide a coun-
tervailing power to industrial lobbying, how the transparency of the
decision-making processes at the international level can be increased,
and in general how decision making concerning environmental stan-
dards can be done in the public interest.
In sum, in order to answer some of the challenges posed by the relationship
between globalization and environmental problems, undoubtedly a multidisci-
plinary approach is needed.
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